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Recent research has shown that the perception of causality affects the judgment of
elapsed time: an interval between an action and a subsequent event seems to be shorter
when people believe that action has caused the event. This article reviews past work on
the phenomenon and integrates the findings from the different settings in which it has
been observed. The effect is found for actions people have personally taken, as well as
for those they have simply read or heard about. It occurs for very short intervals (e.g.,
milliseconds) as well as longer periods (e.g., months or years). Beliefs and expectations
about different types of causal forces and their trajectories over time can affect the
degree of time compression in some settings. But the tendency toward compression
of time is the default and dominant response: It persists when people think of generic
causal relations and is enhanced when people opt for the quickest interpretation of causal
relations. This robust influence of causality on time judgment appears to be linked to the
basic tendency to rely on temporal proximity in processing causal relations and to people’s
early experience with the physical-mechanical world. Past work has focused primarily on
the implications of time compression for the sense of agency, but this phenomenon
has implications also for decisions that depend on time judgment. The compression of
subjective time elapsed between actions and outcomes makes people more optimistically
plan the timing of a focal action in the future, experience its effect earlier in the future,
and be less likely to switch to an alternative course of action. The tendency toward
compression can thus endow an action with a sort of privileged status or advantage.
Keywords: time perception, causality, intentional binding, placebos, intertemporal choice, planning fallacy,
judgment and decision making, agency
Time plays an important role in causal inference. People gen-
erally expect a short time to have elapsed between causes and
their effects and so rely on time as a cue to causation, judg-
ing an event that occurred closer in time to an effect as a more
likely cause than one that occurred at a greater temporal dis-
tance (Hume, 1938; Michotte, 1963; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986;
Shanks et al., 1989; Lagnado and Sloman, 2006). Recent work has
demonstrated, however, that this relationship between time and
causality is bidirectional—the perception of causality can affect
people’s judgments of time in such a way that they perceive events
that they know to be causally related to have occurred closer in
time to each other.
For example, one set of studies focused on intentionality
and showed that perceived time between a voluntary movement
(e.g., pressing a key) and its effect (e.g., an auditory tone) was
shorter compared to a baseline condition in which the action
and its effect occurred within the same amount of time but
without any causal link (the intentional binding effect; Haggard
et al., 2002; see also Eagleman andHolcombe, 2002;Wohlschlager
et al., 2003; Engbert and Wohlschläger, 2007; Moore et al., 2009;
Ebert and Wegner, 2010). Other researchers focused on causal-
ity more generally and contrasted, for instance, estimates of
time elapsed between pairs of historical events that were causally
related (e.g., the launch of Sputnik by the USSR and the landing of
man on the moon with Apollo 11) with estimates of time between
historical events that were not causally related (e.g., the launch
of Sputnik and the Woodstock music festival; Faro et al., 2005;
see also Buehner and Humphreys, 2009; Faro, 2010; Faro et al.,
2010; Buehner, 2012). Here, too, perceived causality shortened
estimates of elapsed time.
In this article we review some of the findings from the differ-
ent settings in which an influence of causality on time judgments
has been observed.1 We have two primary goals. The various
lines of work examining this phenomenon have proceeded mostly
independently, but there are links among the findings that may
shed light on the general tendency and why it may occur. We
draw attention to these. Our second goal is to divert some of
the focus from agency to time perception. Most of the work in
this area has focused on the implications of the effect for the
sense of agency. In particular, because compression of time was
not observed for involuntary movements, researchers suggested
1Some studies showing an effect of causality on time judgments have used
the term “intentional binding,” referring to the shifts in the perceived times of
occurrence of voluntary movements and their outcomes. Other work focused
on judgments of the time interval and has used the term “compression.”
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the effect may be an implicit marker of agency (Haggard et al.,
2002; see Moore and Obhi, 2012, for a recent review on the link
between this phenomenon and agency). In this article we focus
primarily on the implications that the effect has for decisions
that depend on the judgment of time. The compression of sub-
jective time elapsed between actions and outcomes makes people
more optimistically plan the timing of a focal action in the future,
experience its effect earlier in the future, and be less likely to
switch to an alternative course of action. The tendency toward
time compression can thus endow an action with a sort of priv-
ileged status or advantage (see also Engbert and Wohlschläger,
2007).
Our review proceeds as follows. First, we examine the robust-
ness of the effect in different settings. We then review some
process evidence, focusing particularly on several points of link-
age between those findings that may help explain why the effect
occurs and why it seems to be so general. Finally, we review the
implications of the phenomenon.
THE GENERALITY OF THE EFFECT
Early studies have shown an effect of perceived causation on
time judgment by varying the intentionality of motor movements
(Haggard et al., 2002; see also Wohlschlager et al., 2003; Engbert
and Wohlschläger, 2007; Moore et al., 2009; Ebert and Wegner,
2010). Most of these studies used the Libet clock method, in
which participants watch a rotating clock and report the position
of the clock hand to indicate the onset of certain events they expe-
rience (Libet et al., 1983). In the baseline conditions of a study
by Haggard et al. (2002), some participants voluntarily pressed
a key while others heard an auditory tone. They indicated the
timing of these events on the rotating clock. In the experimen-
tal conditions, participants indicated the timing of pressing the
key or hearing the tone, but here the tone followed their action.
The authors found that in the experimental conditions the per-
ceived time of action was later than the baseline condition and
the perceived time of the outcome was earlier than in the base-
line condition. Thus, intentionality compressed the time interval
between actions and their outcomes. In another set of conditions
that tested whether intentionality indeed drives the compression
of time, involuntary movements were induced in participants via
transcranial magnetic stimulation. Haggard et al. found that in
these conditions the compression effect was reversed such that the
interval between involuntary action and effect was longer relative
to the baseline.
While this initial set of studies focused on intentionality of
action, later studies manipulated causality per se. For instance,
some studies manipulated perceptions of causation apparent
in historical events participants read about (Faro et al., 2005).
Other studies have shown the effect of causation on time judg-
ment through perceptual methods using Michotte’s launching
paradigm (Cravo et al., 2009), by manipulating the experienced
covariation or probability of yielding the outcome (Engbert
and Wohlschläger, 2007; Moore et al., 2009), and by providing
study participants an alternative cause that discounts the role
of a focal cause post experience (Faro, 2010). These different
demonstrations have shown that the phenomenon is robust to
different conceptualizations of causality. They also illustrate that
the effect can occur irrespective of when causality is manipu-
lated. Time between actions and outcomes seems shorter when
causality is “sensed” before the time interval and the outcome,
when it is learned during the repeated experience of the action-
outcome sequences, and when casual beliefs are acquired after the
experience of the events and the interval.
Various operationalizations of the dependent measure
(elapsed time) have been employed, including a derived interval
from perceived times of occurrence using the Libet clock method
(Haggard et al., 2002; Wohlschlager et al., 2003; Engbert and
Wohlschläger, 2007; Moore et al., 2009), a direct estimate of
elapsed time on a unit scale (Faro et al., 2005; Engbert et al.,
2008; Humphreys and Buehner, 2009; Moore et al., 2009), and
reproduction of the experienced interval (Faro, 2010; Humphreys
and Buehner, 2010). Finally, the effect has been demonstrated
using a variety of timeframes and action-outcome sequences
including motor movements and outcomes separated by mil-
liseconds (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002), actions and outcomes
separated by longer intervals of up to 4 s (e.g., Humphreys and
Buehner, 2009), consumption of a product and the experience
of its effect minutes later (Faro, 2010), and pairs of historical
events that are years apart (e.g., Faro et al., 2005). Table 1
provides information about different manifestations of this
effect.
The generality and robustness of the effect of causality on time
judgments is noteworthy because time perception phenomena are
known to be context dependent; effects that were found in one
setting were often not observed in others (Block and Zakay, 1997;
Tourangeau et al., 2000). Further, the effect occurs both in settings
in which people are likely unaware of any notions of causality per
se, as well as in settings in which causality and judgments of time
are more explicit in the experimental setting. Irrespective of the
setting, the tendency for compression is the common default, and
it is the standard finding in studies examining causality and time.
These consistent findings suggest that the effect is strong, robust,
and may reflect a basic tendency in the way people treat causality
and time. In the following sections we review some research that
may suggest why this may be the case.
EXPLANATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
The initial findings of Haggard et al. (2002) on intentional bind-
ing were seen as evidence for a predictive motor-control process
in the brain that adjusts the perceived timing of voluntary actions
and their effects and provides a coherent experience of agency.
The findings were also interpreted from a Bayesian perspective as
the inverse of the Humean notion of temporal proximity’s being
a cue to infer causality. In particular, if people tend to attribute
causal relations to events that are close to each other in time,
then, under uncertainty about time, people may shift their esti-
mates of time for causes and effects toward each other (Eagleman
and Holcombe, 2002; see also Buehner and Humphreys, 2009).
This argument is related to the notion of attribute substitu-
tion, whereby a variable that is hard to judge (e.g., time) may
be replaced by a correlated variable (e.g., causality) to which a
person may have easier access (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002).
This Bayesian interpretation of the phenomenon as an automatic
response that relies on a relationship between two correlated
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Table 1 | Summary of some studies showing an effect of causality on time judgments.
References Experimental task
(operationalization of
cause and effect)
Method of interval
assessment
Range of
studied time
intervals
Proposed process/
explanation
Proposed consequences/
implications
Buehner and Humphreys,
2009; Humphreys and
Buehner, 2009
Press key—hear
auditory tone
Numeric estimates,
event synchronization
150ms–4 s Priming of general
causality-time relationship
Anticipated action timing
Ebert and Wegner, 2010 Pull/push joystick—see
object move on
Numeric estimates 100–700ms Retrospective inference Binding associated with
explicit sense of authorship
Engbert and
Wohlschläger, 2007
Press key—hear
auditory tone
Libet clock method 250ms Predictive motor process
based on expectations and
perceptual associative
process
Priviledged representation
of intentional actions
Faro, 2010 Take energy
product—feel
enhanced alertness
Numeric estimates,
reproduction
38 s–6.5min Retrospective inference
based on general
causality-time relationship
Delayed consumption,
early experience of effect,
reluctance to switch to
alternative actions
Faro et al., 2005, 2010 Sputnik launch—
Apollo 11 landing
(historical events)
Numeric estimates 3–184 years Retrospective inference
based on physical-
mechanical causality
Evaluation of actions
undertaken by others
Haggard et al., 2002 Press key—hear
auditory tone
Libet clock method 250–600ms Predictive motor control
process linking intentional
actions and their outcomes
Coherent experience of
agency, early experience of
effect
Moore and Haggard,
2008; Moore et al., 2009
Press key—hear
auditory tone
Libet clock method,
numeric estimates
100–700ms Predictive motor control
process and retrospective
inference
Coherent experience of
agency, early experience of
effect
variables suggests that factors that promote reliance on correlated
cues and shortcuts may moderate the effect. In line with this,
cognitive load, for instance, resulted in greater compression of
subjective time between causally related historical events (Faro,
2010; Faro et al., 2010). Thus, with motor movements as well as
with more-conceptual action-outcome sequences, the compres-
sion effect was seen as an automatic brain response or judgment
that relies on the general relationship between time and causality
(Table 1).
Later work on this phenomenon has suggested that it can
also be driven by inferential processes. In one study, Moore
and Haggard (2008) manipulated the probability (50% vs. 75%)
that the action (press of a key) resulted in the outcome (the
tone). The authors found that when the action was unreliable
in causing the outcome (in the 50% condition), there was time
compression only in the trials in which the outcome occurred.
In contrast, the occurrence of the outcome did not have a sig-
nificant effect on time compression when the action was a more
reliable predictor of the outcome (in the 75% condition). This
was interpreted as evidence that time compression can occur
through a retrospective inference process, because whether the
outcome occurred was known only after the fact (after the action
and the time interval). In a parallel finding, though in a very
different setting, retrospective expert information that two his-
torical events were causally related compressed time estimates,
but only when the causal relationship between the two events was
ambiguous (Faro et al., 2005). This suggests that predictive (pre-
experience) as well as retrospective cues to causality can result
in time compression and that they can substitute for each other
(Moore et al., 2009).
The findings that retrospective cues can result in the compres-
sion of time suggests that top-down processes, such as explicit
beliefs and expectations about causal relations, may affect the
prevalence of this phenomenon. In particular, the cognitive sys-
tem may take into account the causal structure of the envi-
ronment, and this may moderate the extent to which causality
compresses perceived time (Moore and Obhi, 2012). Support for
this notion comes from studies that manipulate the salience of
different types of causal mechanisms and examine the effect it
has on time compression. In one study, participants first elabo-
rated on various physical versus biological phenomena in order
to prime causal forces that typically dissipate or build up over
time (Faro et al., 2010, Study 2). For instance, to prime physi-
cal forces that dissipate over time, participants wrote about how
a rock that is thrown into water can capsize a toy boat. To prime
biological forces that build up over time, they wrote about how a
person who smokes can contract a lung disease. As part of another
task, participants then made elapsed time judgments for pairs of
historical events. Time compression between causally related his-
torical events was attenuated when participants had considered
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biological causal mechanisms before the focal task. The priming
of different causal mechanisms did not have an effect for time
estimates for events that were not causally related, ruling out
potential anchoring on short versus long time intervals that could
be evoked by the priming.
In another study, participants considered emotions (e.g.,
pride, anger) vs. traits (e.g., courage, arrogance) of the actors
involved in the causally related historical events before mak-
ing elapsed time judgments (Faro et al., 2010, Study 3). Those
considering emotions—a type of causal force that is typically
seen as dissipating over time—made shorter time estimates, and
time compression was greater relative to the baseline condition.
Ratings of whether the emotions involved in the events dissipated
(vs. built up) over time were correlated with time estimates. These
findings on the role of emotions in the compression effect for
historical events are consistent with research showing that moti-
vations and desires play a role in intentional binding studies that
employ much shorter time intervals (Engbert and Wohlschläger,
2007).
These recent findings show that although compression of
time may be driven by an automatic process, it can also be
modulated by higher-level beliefs about causation. The extent
to which one or the other plays a role can vary by the task.
The role that different types of causal relations play in mod-
erating the effect is also consistent with the mechanism-based
view of causal reasoning (Ahn et al., 1995; Ahn and Kalish,
2000). This view proposes that when people say that A causes
B, they believe that there is a process that takes place between
A and B in which a force or causal power is transmitted. This
approach, and the concept of force in particular, can suggest a
more-specific accounting for time compression than reliance on
the general relationship between time and causality (see Table 1).
At least in some settings, compression may occur because peo-
ple believe that many causal forces tend to dissipate, and so, for
a cause to have impact, it “needs” to occur close to the effect in
time (McCloskey, 1983). Thus, people might compress the time
between causes and effects because they believe predominantly in
dissipative causal forces, which dominate our early experiences
with causality and with physical objects (Faro et al., 2010; see also
White, 1998, 1999). This may be especially plausible with con-
ceptual action-outcome sequences like historical events. It would
be instructive to examine whether such variations in expectations
about types of causal relations would modulate the effect in other
settings.
What can we make of these findings from the different settings
the effect of causality on time judgments have been observed? Our
aim here is not to propose a specific process account for the phe-
nomenon, as its various manifestations may be driven by different
specific processes (see Table 1 for a summary of different explana-
tions proposed). However, the evidence reviewed here does entail
some linkages and consistent findings. The phenomenon seems to
reflect a possibly automatic, unconscious response: The implicit
manipulation of intentions, and the role of cognitive resources in
enhancing the effect, point in this direction. That the effect per-
sists in more-conceptual settings, with longer time intervals and
with manipulations of causality that take place after the expe-
rience of the interval, suggests that the compression tendency
can be abstracted and generalized to settings in which people
reason more explicitly about causality. That is, people may com-
press time through an automatic judgment process or the brain’s
motor function but can draw on causal information to compress
time also in more-deliberate settings. The salience of non-default,
less familiar types of causal relations (e.g., with causal forces
that build up over time) mutes this tendency in some settings.
But the default and predominant effect of perceiving a causal
relation between two events is to subjectively compress the time
between them.
There is a noteworthy parallel here to the inverse and more-
familiar relationship—the role that temporal contiguity plays in
judgments of causality. When exposed to Michotte’s phenomeno-
logical causality animations, infants as young as three months
show signs of causal processing and “rely” on temporal conti-
guity between cause and effect. As people mature, these early,
partly innate and automatic responses are generalized and play
a role as cues to causality in inference (White, 1988). Cognitive
development and ability make people more sensitive to tempo-
rally distant causes, and here, too, beliefs and expectations about
more-complex causal mechanisms reduce the tendency to rely
on temporal proximity to infer causality (Fletcher et al., 1986;
Schlottmann, 1999; Hagmayer and Waldmann, 2002; Buehner
and May, 2003). It is thus possible that the two responses—the
effect of time on causality, and of causality on time—are rooted
in a common underlying source.
IMPLICATIONS
Most of the work examining the effect of intentionality or causal-
ity on time judgments has focused on its implications for the
sense of agency. The adjustment of time for intentional actions
and their outcomes was seen as evidence for a prereflective sense
of agency, as an implicit marker of agency (see Moore and Obhi,
2012). The compression of time that resulted from the shifts in
the times of occurrence of actions and outcomes was seen as an
index of agency rather than as a variable of interest per se. We
next discuss the implications of this work for decisions that are
dependent on time judgments.
COMPRESSION AND PLANNING OF ACTION
The subjective compression of elapsed time between actions and
their effects may affect people’s plans for when a given action
would need to be taken to produce timely impact in the future.
In a study that tests this hypothesis, participants first consumed
chewing gum and then received bogus feedback that their per-
formance on an alertness task showed improvement. Participants
then learned that the chewing gum was (or was not) causally
associated with improving performance on alertness tasks (Faro,
2010). As dependent measures, participants estimated how long
it may have taken for the chewing gum to have an effect on
their performance (if any). This was the measure by which time
compression was assessed. Then they reported the latest point
they would feel comfortable using the gum again before a sim-
ilar task, for an assessment whether compressed estimates of
elapsed time-to-onset affected future consumption plans. Then
they indicated when they were ready to begin working on the
task after consuming the gum the second time. First, there was a
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compression of time: Participants in the strong-causal-belief con-
dition thought the product took a shorter time to have an effect
on their performance. Second, they reported that they would
consume the gum closer to the time of the task on subsequent
consumption. Third, they waited a shorter period before start-
ing to work on the task after they consumed the gum again.
And, finally, participants’ time-to-onset estimates for the initial
consumption, which were compressed through the manipula-
tion of causality, predicted future planning and consumption
decisions.
Compression of time between causes and effects can therefore
make people delay their future actions. People also tend to under-
estimate the time between causes and effects relative to the actual
interval (Faro et al., 2005). The combination of these factors
(delaying actions because of time compression and underestima-
tion of time relative to the actual interval) implies that people
may be unrealistically optimistic in initiating actions. They would
end up taking previously efficacious (i.e., causal) actions too late
to be effective. This pattern is similar to the “planning fallacy,”
the tendency to underestimate task completion times (Buehler
et al., 1994). We believe the two phenomena are related for sev-
eral reasons. First, plans may be seen as a series of cause-effect
scenarios (Schank and Abelson, 1977). It is thus possible that
one reason people underestimate overall task completion times,
committing the planning fallacy, is because they underestimate
the time between cause-effect pairs making up a plan (see also
Roy et al., 2005). Second, one of the main explanations for the
planning fallacy involves people’s taking an “internal view” of the
situation. Constructing a causal scenario represents one favorable
story of how the future project is likely to unfold (Kahneman
and Lovallo, 1993). In a similar vein, providing a causal sce-
nario of how one event led to another results in time compression
(Faro et al., 2005). Finally, for both phenomena there appears to
be a self-other difference: Underestimation of task compression
time is prominent for tasks undertaken by oneself, not by others
(Buehler et al., 1994). Similarly, in some studies, compression of
time was found to be stronger when an action was taken by one-
self rather than by another person (Desantis et al., 2011; but see
Wohlschlager et al., 2003).
Hence, the perceived compression of time between causally
related events may affect the timing of subsequent actions—
leading to good actions being undertaken too late. This may
also be related to the tendency to underestimate task completion
times. As we discuss below, compression of perceived elapsed time
can also affect expectations regarding the onset of the effect in
the future—with people expecting it will occur earlier than they
should.
COMPRESSION, EFFECT ONSET, AND PLACEBOS
People sometimes report feeling the effect of product consump-
tion (e.g., caffeine) almost instantaneously—within an unreal-
istically short time after consumption (e.g., Reid, 2005). Such
placebo-like effects may be driven by conditioning (Stewart-
Williams and Podd, 2004) or expectations of future performance
(Shiv et al., 2005). The compression of time between actions
and outcomes suggests a more-specific reason for expectations
of unrealistically rapid consumption outcomes. The studies we
reviewed showed that perceived time of voluntary actions shifts
forward in time, but at the same time, their effects subjec-
tively shift backward in time (thus, resulting in compression
of time). This may be one way in which the effect of actions,
including consumption of drugs or other products, may be expe-
rienced earlier in time, especially if people believe in their causal
efficacy.
To our knowledge, previous work on compression of time
between actions and outcomes has not shown this tendency to
expect that effects of consumption will occur prematurely. Recent
work did document a related consequence—how compression
of time for a previous consumption episode may make people
experience the effect earlier upon future consumption. In par-
ticular, the compression phenomenon implies that people may
be prone to underestimate the time it took for a product to
show its effect when they used it in the past if they believe in
its causal efficacy. These recollections of too short a time-to-
onset can alter people’s subsequent consumption experiences,
leading them to report prematurely rapid effects from subsequent
consumption.
Participants in one study consumed chewing gum and then
performed an alertness task (Faro, 2010). Those in the strong-
cause condition were then led to believe that the gumwas respon-
sible for the improved performance they allegedly showed on
the previous task. Those in the weak-cause condition were made
aware of an additional possible influence on their performance
(practice with the task). Replicating a compression effect, those in
the strong-cause condition thought the product had been faster to
have an effect on their previous performance. More importantly,
upon second consumption and performance on a similar task,
participants indicated they had experienced the effect of the prod-
uct earlier. Time-to-onset for previous consumption predicted
the timing of subsequent-effect onset.
These results of perceived earlier onset of the effect of an
external substance link the compression phenomenon to placebo
effects. The study reported abovemanipulated causal efficacy post
experience. Work on placebos has shown that various factors can
affect people’s expectations of the causal efficacy of a treatment
before it is administered and that this can affect the extent of the
placebo effect. For instance, a given treatment is more effective
when it is administered by a clinician than when it is administered
by a computer (Colloca et al., 2004). Accordingly, future stud-
ies can examine whether manipulations that alter the perceived
causal efficacy of external agents before the experience can affect
the extent of temporal compression and result in effects that are
experienced sooner in time.
COMPRESSION AND INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE
Past work has shown compression for causally related events
that were experienced by participants themselves (Haggard et al.,
2002; Engbert andWohlschläger, 2007; Buehner and Humphreys,
2009; Moore et al., 2009; Ebert and Wegner, 2010) or by others
in the past (Wohlschlager et al., 2003; Faro et al., 2005). Might
a similar effect occur for events people anticipate in the future?
Recent work suggests that time compression between causes and
their outcomes can extend to anticipated events, and for events
that participants expect to produce rather than actually produce
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(Engbert and Wohlschläger, 2007; Buehner and Humphreys,
2009; Buehner, 2012). Based on these findings, might a given
time period expected to elapse between two events (e.g., “a
government initiating public works” and “increased economic
growth”) be viewed as shorter if a person believes the first event
will cause the second? If the anticipated interval seems subjec-
tively shorter, might people be more willing to wait if waiting
entails a benefit?
One experimental paradigm through which such intertem-
poral preferences are examined is that of time discounting (see
Frederick et al., 2009, for a review). In a typical study, a partici-
pant may be asked whether he or she would prefer to receive, say,
£1000 now or £1500 one year from now. The tendency to choose
the smaller-sooner amount instead of the larger-later amount is
one way to assess the extent to which people discount future
outcomes. Discounting studies typically employ two points in
time that are void of a semantic link. If causality affects per-
ception of anticipated time, imbuing the two points in time
with meanings of cause and effect can affect discounting (see
also Zauberman et al., 2009). Thus, a person might be more
willing to wait one year and receive £1500 (when “increased
economic growth” occurs) instead of £1000 now (when “pub-
lic works begin”) if he or she believes the first event will cause
the second. Similarly, and again because of compression in antic-
ipated time, mentally simulating how the first event (“public
works”) would cause the second (“increased economic growth”)
may result in greater patience. Using language (e.g., causal verbs;
see Talmy, 1988) that increases the perceived causal link between
the events could have a similar effect on perceived time and
discounting.
The notion that a causal relationship between the two future
points in time can affect perceived duration and, as a result,
time discounting, is linked to recent conjectures on discounting
and another important semantic relationship—perceived simi-
larity. Consider the common finding of hyperbolic discounting
that for the same interval t, people are more patient when t is
farther in the future than when it is near. Rubinstein (2003)
suggested that this occurs because the similarity between two
points in time separated by a common interval increases with
the onset of the interval. Thus, 12 months is more similar to
11 months than 2 months is to 1 month. Similarity may also
explain the recent findings that discount rates that are imputed
when time is described using calendar dates are lower than those
revealed when time is described as a delay (Read et al., 2005;
see also LeBoeuf, 2006). In one study, respondents evaluated two
delayed options framed either as 3 vs. 16 months or as August
29, 2003, vs. September 24, 2004. The authors suggested that
3 and 16 months are less similar to each other than the cor-
responding dates and thus result in greater discounting. Thus,
there is evidence that similarity between two points in time might
affect subjective duration judgments and time discounting. This
recent evidence lends credence to the possibility that perceived
causality can future duration assessments and time discounting
in turn.
Recent work has also shown that an additional and potentially
related variable, spatial distance, can affect the subjective judg-
ments of duration and, in turn, time discounting. For instance,
an individual in Philadelphia may perceive the same three-month
duration from today to be longer when he or she is expecting to be
in Los Angeles three months later than when he or she is expect-
ing to be in New York (Kim et al., 2012). The person may thus be
less patient and discount the same outcome more heavily when
it is to be received in Los Angeles rather than in New York. The
relationship between space and time discounting is noteworthy
because something akin to causal time compression also occurs
for spatial judgments: Perceived causation reduces spatial distance
judgments (Buehner and Humphreys, 2010).
In summary, we conjectured that causality may affect judg-
ment of time for action-outcome sequences that are anticipated
in the future and that this may affect patience and decisions based
on perceived time. We base this on recent work showing other
conceptual, semantic relationships (similarity, spatial distance)
affecting subjective time and patience as a result. The aforemen-
tioned variables are related. Time, similarity, and spatial distance
are cues to causality (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; see also Trope
and Liberman, 2010). Thus, various cues to causality may be
influenced by causality, may affect each other, and in turn influ-
ence decisions that depend on the judged focal variable (e.g., time
discounting).
COMPRESSION, AGENCY, AND CAUSAL INFERENCE
The early findings that showed voluntary actions subjectively bind
to their effects in time were interpreted as an implicit marker of
agency. In particular, it was proposed that the “brain contains a
specific cognitive module that binds intentional actions and their
effects to construct a coherent conscious experience of agency”
(Haggard et al., 2002, p. 384) and thus provides a feeling of fluent
flow from actions to their effects (Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009).
The effect was seen as a factor that enhances the sense of agency.
But it may have implications for causal inference more gener-
ally. Marsh and Ahn (2009) noted that people sometimes may
need or want to link ambiguous events as causes and effects. The
authors suggested that time compression may be one mechanism
that enables this to occur. Long elapsed time between cause and
effect is typically a limiting factor for the emergence of causal
beliefs. Binding related events in time allows people to form and
hold causal beliefs that might otherwise conflict with the tem-
poral proximity cue for causality (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986).
This may make people stick with certain courses of action and be
less likely to switch to alternatives that have not “benefited” from
compression (Faro, 2010). Thus, compression may reinforce the
already advantageous role that temporal proximate causes enjoy
in causal inference. Even when causes and effects are not very near
in time, we may experience them as if they are or remember them
as if they were.
CONCLUSION
People subjectively compress the time that has elapsed between
causes and effects. This phenomenon appears to be linked to
a basic / primitive manner in which people process causality
and time and to early experiences with the physical-mechanical
environment. The tendency is robust and has been documented
in a wide range of settings. The phenomenon has initially
attracted attention as an implicit marker of agency, but it also has
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 217 | 6
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implications for the planning of action, intertemporal choice,
and placebo effects. By shortening the perceived time elapsed
between a focal action and an outcome, compression endows a
focal course of action or cause with apparent advantage or priv-
ileged status. This in turn links the phenomenon back to causal
inference: The effect of perceived causality on time perception
may reinforce the tendency to attribute causality to temporally
proximate causes.
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